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I. INTRODUCTION
On election day, November 14, 1994, Oregon voters elected a
physician, Dr. John Kitzhaber, as their governor and, simultaneously,
granted physicians the legal authority to help people end their own
lives. By passing Ballot Measure 16,1 the voters decided that a
physician may, at a patient's request, prescribe a medication "for the
purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner." 2
The political power to govern a state and the moral power to
collaborate in ending a life were conferred by the citizens in the same
democratic election. Obviously, the citizens can bestow political
power. It is not clear that they can or should bestow the legal
authorization to terminate life by medical means. This is the debate
over legalizing euthanasia.
This Article briefly summarizes the history of the euthanasia
debate in the United States, describes the classical arguments for and
against euthanasia, examines the terms of the current debate, and
concludes that while society may want to recognize a competent
patient's right to escape the suffering of a terminal illness, it should do
so with humility-and with caution.
II. ASSISTED SUICIDE
"Assisted suicide" now appears to be the politically correct
terminology. The word "euthanasia," first used by Francis Bacon in
the sixteenth century to mean, literally, "good" or "happy death," has
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1. The text of this initiative is officially set forth in OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE,
BALLOT MEASURE 16 WITH EXPLANATORY STATEMENT (Aug. 29, 1994).
2. Voters in Oregon Allow Doctors To Help the Terminally Ill Die, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1994, at A28.
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lost any precise meaning it ever had and has attracted some negative
connotations. Therefore, those engaged in the debates often try
defining "euthanasia" precisely for their own purposes or discarding
the word in favor of new terminology that they consider more exact
and less offensive. These various rhetorical tactics have, from time to
time, employed the term "mercy killing;" distinguished between active
and passive, voluntary and involuntary euthanasia; restricted euthanasia
to those voluntary life-endings carried out by the physician; and, more
recently, discarded the term "euthanasia" entirely in favor of "aid-in-
dying," and "assisted suicide." The rhetorical tactics are not, however,
entirely rhetorical: They reflect, at least in the minds of their more
reflective proponents, genuine philosophical differences with different
moral implications.
A. The Classical Arguments
I shall continue to use "euthanasia" as the general category of acts
in which physicians act, in some way, to effect the deaths of patients.
In this vein, it might be useful to rehearse rapidly the classical
arguments against such activity. First, a prohibition against direct
taking of human life, except in self-defense or defense of others, has
been a central tenet of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Second, the
ethics of medicine have always emphasized the restoration of health
and have long repudiated killing the sick. The Hippocratic Oath states
"I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any
such counsel." 3 Third, the dedication of the medical profession to the
welfare of patients and to the promotion of their health might be
compromised by the complicity of physicians in the death of the very
ill. Fourth, the slippery slope always threatens: An "angel of mercy"
can become a fanatic, bringing the "comfort of death" to those who do
not clearly request it, then to others who "would be better off dead,"
and finally to whole classes of "undesirable" persons. The "euthana-
sia" program initiated in Germany during the 1930's was first directed
only to the incurably ill but gradually expanded into genocide.'
These classical arguments persuade many that physicians have an
absolute obligation to refrain from active euthanasia; others are not so
convinced. Some physicians are sympathetic toward active euthanasia
and admit (privately to colleagues or anonymously in surveys) that they
3. AM. JUR. 3D. Proof of Facts: Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 832 (16th ed.
1989).
4. See Andrew A. Skolnick, Museum Scholars to Apply Holocaust Experience to 1990s
Biomedical Issues, 268 JAMA 575 (1992).
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have practiced it. The Hemlock Society has reported that, to protect
the respondents from legal liability, it destroyed questionnaires in
which 118 doctors out of 588 questioned admitted they had committed
mercy killing of a patient.'
Many contemporary philosophers are skeptical of the logic on
which the classical arguments rest. They also question society's ability
to draw the major classical distinctions: "killing" versus "allowing to
die"; "direct" versus "indirect" killing; "active" versus "passive";"ordinary" versus "extraordinary"; "omission" versus "commission."
A challenge to the classical arguments by philosopher James Rachels
was published in the New England Journal of Medicine several years
ago.6 The somewhat cerebral argument of that essay led logically to
the controversial conclusion that active euthanasia was ethically
acceptable, but it stirred up nothing like the storm of protest aroused
by a physician's much more visceral account, published in the New
England Journal of Medicine and widely quoted, of helping a
terminally-ill patient named "Debbie" end her life.7 Adding insult to
injury, historians have cast doubt on the meaning and observance of
the venerable Hippocratic injunction against giving poison to patients.
Proponents of legalizing euthanasia have asserted that barriers of law
and policy can prevent a slide down the slippery slope.
When the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine (1978-1983) examined the classical arguments
about euthanasia, it generally shared its resident philosophers'
skepticism about these arguments.' It did not commend their use as
the basis for ethical decision making. At the same time, it recognized
that the classical arguments and distinctions are not without utility.
The Commission reported that
The distinction between acting and omitting to act provides a useful
rule-of-thumb by separating cases that probably deserve more
scrutiny from those that are likely not to need it . .. . [T]he
commonly accepted prohibition of active killing helps to produce the
correct decision in the great majority of cases . . . . Thus the
Commission concludes that the current interpretation of the legal
prohibition of active killing should be sustained.9
5. Group Burns Records on Euthanasia Survey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1988, at A22.
6. James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975).
7. It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
8. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT (1983) [HEREINAFTER PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
9. Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
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B. The Current Debate
The debate over euthanasia has been carried on for more than a
century in the United States, at least since a flurry of articles about
euthanasia appeared in medical journals during the 1870s. 10 General-
ly, it has taken place in a quiet undertone, although legal cases have
leapt into the headlines from time to time, the most recent arising from
Dr. Jack Kervorkian's campaign to force the issue by advertising his
own participation in the suicides of some twenty persons. 1 The
latest phase of this long debate has been the introduction of the issue
into our most vocal and public forum, our electoral process. Votes on
euthanasia are nothing new. Bills to authorize euthanasia were
proposed and defeated in the Iowa and Ohio legislatures soon after the
turn of the century. 2 But never before has the issue been debated so
widely. In the early 1990s, Washington,13 California, 4 and Ore-
goni put the legalization of euthanasia before their voters. All three
states have the initiative process that allows the signatures of a certain
number of citizens to place a proposal on the ballot. If the proposal
passes in a general election, it becomes law, without action by the
elected legislature.
1. Oregon Initiative
Using the initiative process, Oregon voters have passed the first
statute in American history that authorizes euthanasia. 6 The voters
were asked to approve only this very limited proposal:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to
be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily
expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for
10. See Charles W. Triche III & Diane Samson Triche, THE EUTHANASIA CONTROVERSY,
1812-1974: A BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH SELECT ANNOTATIONS (1975).
11. Norm Mayfield, Kervorkian Is No Killer, HOus. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1993, at Outlook 3.
12. Stanley Joe Reiser, The Dilemma of Euthanasia In Modern Medical History: The English
and American Experience, in THE DILEMMA OF EUTHANASIA 27, 36 (John A. Behnke & Sissela
Bok eds., 1975).
13. Lori Olszewski, Right-to-Die Advocate In S.F.; He's Promoting Ballot Initiative Allowing
Physician-Assisted Suicide, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 28, 1992, at A25.
14. Paul Jacobs, Emotions Run High Over Doctor-Aided Death Issue; Prop. 161; Proponents
Say Patients Could "Die With Dignity;" Opponents Say There Are Not Enough Safeguards, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at Al.
15. Oregon Voters Allow Assisted Suicide For The Terminally Ill, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov.
11, 1994, at A34.
16. Id.
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medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner in accordance with this act. 7
This new law allows physicians to respond only to a patient's request
for a prescription that will allow the patient to obtain a medication that
the patient can use for suicide. It does not authorize the physician to
administer the medication or to perform any other action, such as
injecting potassium chloride or morphine or using carbon dioxide. The
new law permits the most exact form of what is now called "assisted
suicide," that is, a situation in which the patient determines to end his
or her life and carries out the necessary actions him or herself. The
physician merely assists by doing the two things he or she can do as
physician: determining the medication that will most effectively,
humanely and painlessly end the patient's life, and writing a prescrip-
tion for the medication and dosage.
Despite these limitations, the Oregon legislation is historic,
although it reveals no more about the nature of the debate than the
Washington and California measures, which lost at the polls."8
2. The Washington Initiative
The Washington events, in which I was an active participant, are
as instructive as any. In 1991, the citizens of the State of Washington
voted on an initiative that would have authorized physicians to help
their patients die "swiftly and painlessly." The results of the election
were close: forty-six percent in favor, fifty-four percent against,19
after a vigorous campaign that ended with a very large voter turn-
out.2° The ballot asked whether the existing Natural Death Act of
the State of Washington should be amended to allow "a competent
patient to request of a physician aid-in-dying." "Aid-in-dying" was
defined as an act that would bring about the swift and painless death
of the patient in a humane manner.2 Only a competent patient
capable of making a voluntary request could receive this service from
the physician at the time the request was made. At the same time, the
ballot provided for two other revisions of the Natural Death Act.22
First, a persistent vegetative state was to be classified as a "terminal
17. George J. Annas, Death By Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1240, 1241 (1994).
18. Olazewski, supra note 13, at A25; Jacobs, supra note 14, at Al.
19. Results, SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1991, at D6.
20. County's Voter Turnout Surpasses Previous High, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at C3.
21. Group Crying Foul Over "Death With Dignity"--Some Signers of Petition Say It's
Misrepresented, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 1990, at D4.
22. Id.
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condition" for which life-support could be terminated and, second,
nutrition and hydration were added to the life-supporting technologies
that could be discontinued under provisions of the Directive to
Physicians.23
The last two provisions were not contested by the majority of
those who debated the initiative. The provision that permitted aid-in-
dying, however, generated heated debate. Proponents argued that it
was a logical extension of our endorsement of individual autonomy.
They argued for the ability of those who choose aid-in-dying to
eliminate or avoid pain, suffering, and a diminished quality of life.
Opponents replied that the initiative would be the first step down a
slippery slope that would lead to involuntary euthanasia. The
opponents pointed to the absence, in their view, of sufficient safeguards
to detect and prevent: coercion of the ill and elderly to end burden-
some and costly lives; the overly hasty choice of death by distressed
persons; and, in the absence of any reporting requirement, the covert
euthanasia of some who had not requested it. Opponents rested their
argument less on principle than on the undesirable consequences that
might follow. This argument, of course, rests on unverifiable
predictions about the future.
Physicians were deeply divided over the Washington initiative.
Polls showed an almost fifty-fifty split in opinion, although the official
position of the State Medical Association was negative by an almost
unanimous vote at its annual meeting. These opinions were verified
in a study done one year after the election. About 1,000 Washington
State physicians responded to a questionnaire about their opinions on
euthanasia (defined as "deliberate administration of an overdose of
medication to an ill patient at his or her request with the primary
intent to end his or her life") and physician-assisted suicide (defined
as "prescription of medication or counseling of an ill patient so he or
she may use an overdose to end his or her own life"). Forty-eight
percent agreed with the statement that euthanasia is never ethically
justified and forty-two percent disagreed.24  Fifty-four percent
thought euthanasia should be legal in some situations, but only thirty-
three percent said that they would be willing to participate.2" Fifty-
three percent thought assisted suicide should be legal in some
situations, but only forty percent said they would be willing to help a
23. Id.
24. Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Among
Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 89, 91 (1994).
25. Id.
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patient commit suicide.26 These opinions represented strongly held
views.27 Obviously, a medical community that has been extensively
exposed to the arguments about these issues remains deeply divided.
3. Compassion in Dying v. Washington
After the defeat of the Washington initiative, an organization
called Compassion in Dying was formed to assist terminal patients who
choose to die through rational suicide.28 Assistance means "providing
information, counseling, emotional support, and personal presence at
the time of death."29 The organization limits its attention to people
who have been diagnosed with terminal illnesses and are competent to
request assistance. It repudiates the use of active means, such as lethal
injection or asphyxiation, advocating only self-administration by the
patient of a medication that will effect death.
During 1993, Compassion in Dying, in concert with three
terminally-ill patients, challenged the legality of Washington State's
statute forbidding cooperation in suicide. 30 That statute provides
that, "a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he
knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide."'"
Violation of the statute constitutes a felony punishable by imprison-
ment for a maximum of five years and a ten-thousand dollar fine.32
The plaintiffs claimed that this statute infringed upon their
constitutional right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
Their plea was heard in Federal District Court, where Judge Barbara
Rothstein issued an opinion that upheld their claim.34 She agreed that
the liberty interest reached the intimate personal decision involved in
choosing to end one's life.3" Judge Rothstein's decision represents a
legal first: Never before has the legality of assisted suicide been argued
as a constitutional issue in federal court and never before has it been
endorsed as a constitutional right.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Group Forms To Help the Dying Commit Suicide, SEATTLE TIMES, May 4, 1993, at D1.
29. Id.
30. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994).
32. Id.
33. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1455.
34. Id. at 1467.
35. Id.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEBATE
The Ninth Circuit recently reversed Rothstein,36 but press
reactions made it clear that her decision had struck a responsive chord.
The Seattle Post-Intelligencer suggested that the Ninth Circuit had
"miss[ed] the point."37 When the case reaches the Supreme Court,
the newspaper argued, "if reason prevails, it will be upheld. '38  In
terms of public thinking on the issue, Rothstein may have let the genie
out of the bottle.39
Rothstein's decision forms part of the renewed debate about
euthanasia, which erupted in the 1990s after several decades of
discussion about the role of physicians and medical technology in
sustaining life. As new life-sustaining technologies, such as ventilators
and dialysis, became available in the 1960s, the awareness dawned that
these technologies could not only save and sustain life but also support
lives that some people considered "not worth living."
The case of Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman sustained in a
persistent vegetative state by a respirator, was widely publicized by the
media in 1976 and became the first legal case in which a court
authorized withdrawal of life support.40  Broad discussions about
foregoing life-supporting and life-extending treatment ensued in legal,
medical, and public policy circles, as well as in the popular media.
These discussions have led to consensus within the profession and the
public that certain treatments may ethically be omitted by physician,
patient and family, even if death ensues. "Orders not to resuscitate"
and decisions not to initiate critical care or to discontinue such care
once begun have gained wide acceptance as ethical practices in
medicine. Debate continues at the margins about such issues as
discontinuing nutrition or hydration. This has been a reasonable and
beneficial response to an exaggerated use of technology and to a
deplorable neglect of patients' preferences.
Now, however, the premonitions of some early critics of this
evolution seem to have come true: If we permit omission of treatment,
they warned, we will soon tolerate commission of lethal acts. If the
strong injunction to save and prolong life is relaxed even in the least,
the stronger prohibition against killing will begin to weaken. So,
36. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
37. Right To Die Form of Ptivacy, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 1995, at A14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. In re QOinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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despite the President's Commission's endorsement of the legal
prohibition against active killing, the words of the philosopher Rachels
may become the common wisdom: "[I]f my contention is right, it
follows that active euthanasia is not any worse than passive euthanasia
• .. and the difference in some cases in their consequences . . . may
make active and not passive euthanasia, the morally preferable
option.""
Thus, in only a few years, the debate over euthanasia has moved
from acceptance of "foregoing life-support" to serious consideration of
lethal acts. In the face of this apparent confirmation that we are
starting down the slippery slope, many physicians may begin to worry.
Most physicians, it seems, find euthanasia repugnant. Yet, if the
classical arguments are philosophically and historically indefensible,
how can that repugnance be rationally justified? What "arguments for
the faith that is in them" can those physicians who are reluctant to
become accomplices in aid-in-dying offer? The President's Commis-
sion urges, "health care professionals, individually and through their
professional associations must become more active in creating,
explaining and justifying their standards regarding appropriate
professional rules."42 Yet, if the classical arguments seem so uncon-
vincing to the ethicists, how can health care professionals accomplish
this task?
The philosophers had concentrated on the logic of arguments for
and against euthanasia. As mentioned above, arguments formerly
considered logically impregnable have yielded to closer logical scrutiny
and many of them, such as the distinctions between "action" and"omission" are now standing, if they stand at all, on shaky logical
ground. Many people have turned from the logical and philosophical
arguments to the pragmatic and consequentialist ones. They ask not
whether euthanasia is right or wrong in itself, but whether its tolerated
practice in a society will bring about positive or negative consequences.
This is an argument in which non-philosophers have as much right to
participate as philosophers, and in which physicians, who live very
close to the problem of dealing with death, have a particular right to
join.
IV. THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND EUTHANASIA
Determining whether the consequences of euthanasia will be
positive or negative depends upon the principle on which we choose to
41. Rachels, supra note 6, at 80.
42. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 89.
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base the ethics of euthanasia. Traditionally, that principle has been the
moral obligation to relieve pain and suffering. In the long history of
the debates over active euthanasia, the earliest arguments concentrated
on bringing merciful deaths to those who were suffering great pain.
Euthanasia was an act of beneficence or mercy, hence the common
term "mercy killing."
The voluntary choice of the patient was mentioned but not
considered central or even necessary. In these earlier discussions, it
was not unusual for a proponent to slip easily from advocating
euthanasia for those requesting it to advocating it for those whose lives
were, in the eyes of others, terrible. For example, a physician wrote in
1944:
"To end a life that is useless, helpless and hopeless seems merciful
.... The useless, helpless and hopeless are of many kinds. They
either always have been or have become unfit in the struggle of life
.... idiots and the insane, imbeciles and morons, psychopaths both
mild and severe, criminals and delinquents, monsters and defectives,
incurables and the worn out senile. 43
A leading medical ethicist, Joseph Fletcher, who centered his moral
philosophy on the freedom of individuals, advocated voluntary
euthanasia, but seemed to tolerate what he called a "partly eugenic
position," involuntary euthanasia for "monstrosities at birth and mental
"14defectives ....
Arguments based on beneficence were vulnerable to a strong
counterargument, namely, that the opinion that some persons might
hold about "the useless, helpless and hopeless," might be seriously
discriminatory. The meaning of those terms is colored by ideology,
prejudice and bias. "Useless" depends on what some individuals or a
whole society counts as a contribution, and estimates of this can differ
dramatically according to culture, economic status, education, race, and
so forth.
In the current arguments, the focus shifts from escaping a"useless" existence or relieving pain to the freedom and autonomy of
the patient. This shift puts the responsibility for evaluating quality of
life into the hands of the terminal patient who wants his or her life
ended. Other people are only the implementers, not the evaluators.
Thus, in principle, the "slippery slope" is avoided: The level ground
of autonomy-persons making competent judgments in their own
43. Frank Hinman, Euthanasia, 99 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 640 (1944).
44. Joseph F. Fletcher, MORALS AND MEDICINE 207 (1954).
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behalf-becomes the basis for legalizing euthanasia or, more accurately,
assisted suicide. This is the argument that Judge Rothstein accepted
and termed a "liberty interest" protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 5
However, it is not easy to stay within the bounds of that "liberty
interest." Emotionally, logically, and even legally, the principle of
beneficence creeps back into the argument. Some persons may feel
that, should they have an early diagnosis of a deteriorating condition
that would compromise mental status, such as Alzheimer's disease,
they should be allowed to give an advance directive covering aid-in-
dying as well as abatement of life support. An advance directive
implies that someone other than the patient will make the decision at
the appropriate time. That other person will be bound to honor the
patient's wishes, apparently acting on the principle of the patient's
autonomy, but will inevitably have to make a personal judgment about
the welfare of the patient under the current conditions. This reintro-
duces the principle of beneficence and the value judgments of people
other than the patient.
In addition, the conditions of certain patients, such as those
severely damaged by trauma or congenital conditions, call for
alleviation. Such patients have never had the opportunity to make a
request for aid-in-dying; but, should they not have the right to that
service when it is reasonable? Again, the principle of beneficence
appears even more forcefully.
The argument that aid-in-dying should extend to such patients
can appeal to the commonly accepted legal principle that the incompe-
tent have not lost their fundamental rights. This principle has been
recognized in important judicial decisions about foregoing life support;
why should it not be recognized when the question is aid-in-dying,
proponents may ask.
V. Do SAFEGUARDS INFRINGE UPON PERSONAL AUTONOMY?
Although legal and ethical toleration of euthanasia is based upon
the principle of personal autonomy, the social practice of euthanasia
must be surrounded, as all serious commentators note, with strong
safeguards to prevent abuse. Oregon's statute and the other proposed
statutes hedge the act of requesting aid-in-dying with many barriers:
Persons requesting such aid must be diagnosed by several physicians
as terminally-ill; they must express themselves multiple times and in
45. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1455.
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writing; they must be assessed for mental competence; they must wait
certain time periods; they must obtain witnesses who will attest to the
validity of their requests. These safeguards are intended to prevent the
slide down the slippery slope that could otherwise sweep up the
unwilling, the incompetent, the depressed. At the same time, each of
them infringes on the patient's autonomy. Indeed, each safeguard puts
into the hands of others, principally physicians, the right to veto a
request. Thus, ironically, an attempt to honor personal autonomy may
become another prison. Although many who seek to escape the prison
of a suffering life will succeed, some will still be restrained by these
procedural safeguards from doing so.
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the adoption of statutes such as Oregon's Measure 16 will
be seen by many as a major humanitarian advance. When technologi-
cal medicine, so beneficial in many respects, can save lives but doom
patients to great suffering for the remainder of their time, those who
face such dreadful and diminished lives should have the power to
demand that medicine, which has enabled these lives to exist, also be
empowered to end them. The proponents of humane and dignified
death make this claim and often illustrate it with two typical vignettes:
the patient trapped in the coils of medical machinery and the patient
agonized by intractable pain. Both were prominent images in the
political campaigns in Washington, Oregon, and California.
It is true, of course, that modem medicine saves lives that it
cannot otherwise improve. It is also true that life is prolonged today
by the drugs that cure a pneumonia in a fifty-year-old or leukemia in
a twelve-year-old. Life is prolonged by nutrition, by immunization, by
clean water, and by safer work places. Still, many proponents of a
humane "death with dignity" seem to suggest that active euthanasia
will abolish the terminal indignity of death itself. Unfortunately, it
will not. Even with this "humane" legislation, we must struggle with
the ineradicable human problem of finitude. The old often become old
without being subjected to intensive care, and they deteriorate in body
and mind despite what medicine can do. Many persons die miserably
outside and apart from the world of health care. Many of these will
not have the opportunity to request aid-in-dying, and many, even if
they had the opportunity, might choose not to do so.
Euthanasia for the voluntary and competent patient seems
plausible and liberal. However, it can be criticized as yet another facile
technological solution to a perennial human problem. We can
efficiently abolish dying-that is, the process that leads to death-but
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we cannot abolish death itself. We can hide the misery but not the
ultimate fact. If we can ethically and legally do that for someone who
requests it, why not for each and every sufferer of terminal misery?
The possibility of swift and painless death will inevitably become the
necessity. The privilege granted to the competent will be seen as a
right of which others, less fortunate than the competent, should not be
deprived. In the end, banishing the misery of dying may not be the
undiluted benefit that it appears from a distance.
We may pass laws that tolerate euthanasia and protect those
decent people who request and help perform it. But we must never
become comfortable with the practice.
